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 The Governance of Economic, 
Monetary and Financial Affairs 

 5 
 The Confusion of Tasks in the 
Decision-Making Process of the 
European Economic Governance 
 ALEXANDRE  DE STREEL 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 SINCE THE START of the Euro-crisis in 2010, the governance of the Eurozone has been substantially revised to an extent unthinkable before the crisis. The governance is now based on four main pillars whose objectives, scope and 
European oversight vary. 1 The fi rst pillar relates to  surveillance of national fi scal 
imbalances . It aims to prevent and, if necessary, correct fi scal imbalances having 
spill-over effects between Member States and threatening the stability of the Euro-
zone; it applies to all Member States of the European Union (EU) with the possi-
bility of more sanctions against the states of the euro area. The second pillar relates 
to the  surveillance of national macroeconomic imbalances . As for fi scal imbalances, 
it aims to prevent and correct macro-economic imbalances having spill-over 
effects. The third pillar relates to the  coordination of national economic and social 
policies . It aims to achieve economic convergence within the EU; it applies to all 
Member States; and it does not provide for sanctions against defaulting Member 
States. The fourth pillar relates to  conditional solidarity between Member States . It 
aims to alleviate the bankruptcy of a Member State and ensure the stability of the 
Eurozone; it is limited to the Member States of the euro area. 
 This paper focuses on the fi rst two pillars of the reformed economic govern-
ance applied to the Member States of the euro area. Section II describes the new 
decision-making process to ensure surveillance and coordination of the national 
economic policies as well as to sanction the violation of the rules by the Member 
States. Section III explains how the functioning of the national governments, the 
 1  For a description of the evolution of the different pillars of the economic governance, see  J-P 
 Keppenne ,  ‘ Institutional Report ’ in  The Economic and Monetary Union , XXVI FIDE Congress in 
Copenhagen ( 2014 )  179 – 257 ;  A  de Streel ,  ‘ The Evolution of the EU Economic Governance since the 
Treaty of Maastricht:  An Unfi nished Task ’ ( 2013 )  20  Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law 20th Anniversary Issue  336 . 
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European Commission and the Council of Ministers has been improved for a bet-
ter compliance with the rules. Section IV claims that the new process does not 
suffi ciently distinguish between the technical assessment and the discretionary 
choices made by each institution, and does not suffi ciently subject each of those 
tasks to effectiveness and legitimacy requirements. Section V shows that a different 
allocation of competences could make the decision-making process more effective 
and legitimate. 2 Finally, Section VI concludes with proposals for policy reforms. 
 II. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR THE 
GOVERNANCE OF THE EURO AREA 
 The decision-making process for the fi rst two pillars of the reformed economic 
governance is based on: (a) a dialogue between the national governments, the 
European Commission and the Council of Ministers for the surveillance and 
the coordination of national economic and social policies; which (b) may lead 
to fi nancial sanctions decided by the Council; and which (c) takes place in the 
shadow the EU and national courts. 
 A.  The Annual Cycle of Surveillance of Imbalances and Coordination of 
Economic Policies: An Executive Dialogue 
 1. The Surveillance of National Fiscal Imbalances 
 The surveillance of national fi scal imbalances takes place as follows. 3 In April, 
each Member State submits to the Commission its  Stability Programme (SP) 
which describes its fi scal policy for the next three years. 4 Such stability pro-
gramme should be based on macroeconomic forecasts produced or endorsed by a 
national independent fi scal council. 5 At the same time, each Member State adopts 
 2  The effectiveness and the legitimacy of the EU budgetary constrain are analysed in several contri-
butions published in  M  Adams ,  F  Fabbrini and  P  Larouche (eds),  The Constitutionalization of European 
Budgetary Constraints:  Comparative and Interdisciplinary Perspectives ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2014 ) . 
 3  For an overview of the revised Stability and Growth Pact, see European Commission,  ‘ Building 
a Strengthened Fiscal Framework in the European Union: A Guide to the Stability and Growth Pact ’ 
(2013) European Economy: Occasional Paper 150; European Commission,  ‘ Vade mecum on the 
Stability and Growth Pact ’ European Economy: Occasional Paper (2013) 151. 
 4  Art 4 Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance 
of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [ 1997 ]  OJ L209/1 , 
amended by  Council Regulation (EC) 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005 [ 2005 ]  OJ L174/1 and by  Regula-
tion (EU) 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 [ 2011 ]  OJ 
L306/12 ; Specifi cations of 3 September 2012 on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact 
and Guidelines on the format and content of Stability and Convergence Programmes. 
 5  Art 2(1b) Regulation (EU) 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 
2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the cor-
rection of excessive defi cit of the Member States in the euro area [ 2013 ]  OJ L140/11 . 
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a  medium-term fi scal plan compatible with the fi scal country-specifi c recommen-
dation addressed previously by the Council to the Member State. 6 
 In May, the Economic Department of the European Commission (the 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, DG ECFIN) produces 
the Spring Economic Forecast, which projects the macroeconomic and budgetary 
indicators for each Member State. On that basis, the DG ECFIN assesses whether 
each stability programme complies with the EU defi cit rules (the 3 per cent of the 
GDP ceiling set for the nominal public defi cit and the Medium Term Objective 
set for the structural public balance) and debt rule (the 60 per cent of the GDP 
ceiling). 7 On the basis of this analysis, and within the discretion provided by the 
EU fi scal rules, the Commission College recommends to the Council of Ministers 
the adoption for each Member State of  one fi scal country-specifi c recommendation 
(CSR) which sets fi scal targets and/or means to achieve those targets. 
 In June, the Economic and Financial Committee, which is composed of  senior 
offi cials of the national fi nance ministries and of the European Commission, 8 
 analyses the economic assessment made by the Commission services and negoti-
ates the fi scal country-specifi c recommendations proposed by the Commission ’ s 
 College. Then, the Council of Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) adopts by quali-
fi ed majority the fi scal CSRs 9 and can only amend the Commission proposal by 
explaining the reasons for the changes ( ‘ comply or explain ’ rule). 10 As was the case 
for the Commission, the Ministers decide within the discretion provided by the EU 
fi scal rules. 
 Note that if a Member State does not comply with its fi scal country-specifi c 
recommendation, the Commission addresses a warning and proposes a new and 
more prescriptive recommendation. The Council adopts this recommendation by 
qualifi ed majority and following the  ‘ comply or explain ’ rule. 11 The Commission 
may also propose a deposit bearing interest of 0.2 per cent GDP. This sanction is 
automatically adopted by the Council unless a qualifi ed majority opposes, that is, 
under a reverse qualifi ed majority voting system. 12 
 Then in October, each Member State submits to its national parliament its  draft 
budget 13 and submits to the European Commission a  draft budgetary plan , which 
summarises the draft budget. 14 
 6  Art 4 Regulation 473/2013. 
 7  Those rules are provided by primary EU law (Art 126 TFEU and Protocol 12), secondary EU law 
(Art 2(a) Regulation 1466/97) and international treaties (Arts 3 – 4 TSCG). 
 8  The Economic and Financial Committee is established by Art 134 TFEU and the Council Deci-
sion 2012/245 of 26 April 2012 on a revision of the Statutes of the Economic and Financial Committee 
[ 2012 ]  OJ L121/22 . 
 9  Such recommendation is adopted on the basis of Art 121(2) TFEU. 
 10  Art 2-ab(2) Regulation 1466/97 amended. 
 11  Such recommendation is adopted on the basis of Art 121(4) TFEU. 
 12  Art 4 Regulation (EU) 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area [ 2011 ]  OJ L306/1 . 
 13  Art 4(2) Regulation 473/2013. 
 14  Art 6 Regulation 473/2013, Section II of the Specifi cations of 1 July 2013 on the implementation 
of the Two Pack and Guidelines on the format and content of draft budgetary plans, economic partner-
ship programmes and debt issuance reports. 
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 In November, the Economic Department of the European Commission pro-
duces the Autumn Economic Forecast. On that basis, the DG ECFIN assesses 
whether each draft budgetary plan complies with the EU fi scal rules, respects the 
Stability Programme and takes into account the fi scal country-specifi c recommen-
dation. On the basis of this analysis, the Commission College adopts an  opinion on 
each draft budgetary plan, and if it does not comply with EU rules, it may request 
a revision of the plan. 15 Here again, the College decides within the discretion left 
by EU fi scal rules. 
 2.  The Surveillance of Macroeconomic Imbalances and the Coordination of 
National Economic and Social Policies 
 The surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances and the coordination of national 
economic and social policies runs as follows. In November, the Commission 
adopts the  Annual Growth Survey which summarises the economic situation of 
the EU and proposes priorities for economic reforms at European and national 
levels to stimulate growth and jobs. The Commission also reviews the  macroeco-
nomic evolution of the Member States on the basis of a scoreboard of 11 indicators 
and indicates the States which justify an in-depth review. 16 
 In the spring, the priorities of the Annual Growth Survey are discussed by sev-
eral Council confi gurations (in particular, the Council of Finance Ministers, the 
Council of Employment and Social Affairs Ministers and the Council of Com-
petitiveness Ministers), the European Council (composed of the heads of state 
or government) and the European Parliament. The Commission also concludes 
the macroeconomic in-depth review indicating the Member States which present 
imbalances to be corrected. 17 
 Then in April, each Member State submits its  National Reform Programme 
(NRP) , which describes their past and future reforms for economic, employ-
ment and social policies. 18 Such national reform programme should be based on 
national macroeconomic forecast produced or endorsed by a national independ-
ent fi scal council and be consistent with the stability programme. 
 In May, a core group of the Commission departments (mainly Economic and 
Financial Affairs, Employment and Social Affairs and the Secretariat General) 
assesses whether each national reform programme takes into account the Council 
integrated economic policies guidelines, 19 the Commission Annual Growth Survey 
and the country-specifi c recommendations previously addressed by the Council 
 15  Art 7 Regulation 473/2013. 
 16  Arts 3 and 4 Regulation (EU) 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [ 2011 ]  OJ L306/25 . 
 17  Art 5 Regulation 1176/2011. 
 18  Art 2-a (2d) Regulation 1466/97 amended. 
 19  Council Recommendation (EU) 2010/410 of 13 July 2010 on broad guidelines for the economic 
policies of the Member States and of the Union [ 2010 ]  OJ L291/28 and  Council Decision (EU) No 
2010/707 of 21 October 2010 on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States [ 2010 ] 
 OJ L308/46 . 
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84 Alexandre de Streel
to the Member State concerned. It also assesses the evolution of macroeconomic 
imbalances. On the basis of those analyses, the Commission College recommends 
to the Council the adoption of several  country-specifi c recommendations (CSR) to 
be combined with the fi scal recommendation. Such recommendations may set 
objectives to be met and/or socio-economic policies to achieve those targets. In 
doing so, the College enjoys a broad political discretion. 
 In June, four Council committees composed of senior national offi cials (the Eco-
nomic and Financial Committee, the Economic Policy Committee, the Employ-
ment Committee and the Social Protection Committee) analyse the Commission 
services economic assessment and discuss the recommendations proposed by the 
College. Then, Council of Finance Ministers and the Council of Employment 
Ministers negotiate the draft CSRs. Then, the Summer European Council endorses 
the texts of the Councils and, fi nally, the Council of Finance Ministers formally 
adopts the country-specifi c recommendations by qualifi ed majority and follow-
ing the  ‘ comply or explain ’ rule. Like the Commission, the Council enjoys political 
discretion in the negotiation of the CSRs. 
 B. Sanctions when Rules are Violated 
 If a Member State violates the EU fi scal rules or presents excessive macroeconomic 
imbalances, it faces corrective procedures leading to the imposition of fi nancial 
sanctions by the Council. 
 In case of violation of the EU defi cit or debt rules, a Member State may be 
subject to the  excessive defi cit procedure (EDP) with the following steps: (i) On 
the basis of a thorough economic analysis by Economic Department of the Euro-
pean Commission, the College of Commissioners may propose to the Council of 
Finance Ministers to place a Member State under an excessive defi cit procedure 
and to set up a fi scal trajectory to comply with EU rules. 21 In proposing this tra-
jectory, the Commission enjoys some political discretion. (ii) After an opinion of 
the Economic and Financial Committee, the ECOFIN Council adopts a decision 
opening the excessive defi cit procedure by reverse qualifi ed majority of the Mem-
ber States of the euro area 22 and the State concerned cannot vote to alleviate an 
obvious confl ict of interest. 23 The Council also adopts a recommendation setting a 
deadline to reduce the defi cit to below 3 per cent of the GDP with a fi scal trajectory 
to reach such deadline. 24 Here again, the Council enjoys some political discretion. 
(iii) In this case, the Member State is subject to extensive reporting requirements 
 21  Art 126(3) TFEU. 
 22  Art 126(6) TFEU, Art 139(4b) TFEU and Art 7 TSCG. 
 23  Art 126(13) TFEU. 
 24  Art 126(7) TFEU. 
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with the regular submission of economic partnership programmes which allow 
the DG ECFIN and then the College of Commissioners to closely monitor the 
implementation of the budgetary trajectory imposed by the Council. 25 In case of 
non-compliance, the College of Commissioners proposes a graduation of fi nan-
cial sanctions. The ECOFIN Council decides those sanctions by reverse qualifi ed 
majority. 26 
 This EU corrective procedure is now complemented by a  national correction pro-
cedure . If the national independent fi scal council observes a signifi cant deviation 
from the Medium Term Objective set for the structural public balance, a national 
correction procedure proportionate to the deviation should be triggered. 27 
 In case of excessive macroeconomic imbalances, a Member State may be subject 
to an  excessive imbalance procedure (EIP) with the following steps: (i) After a thor-
ough economic analysis by Economic Department of the European Commission, 
the College of Commissioners may propose to the Council of Finance Ministers 
to place a Member State under excessive imbalance procedure. 28 Here also, the 
Commission enjoys some political discretion in making this choice. (ii) After dis-
cussion in the Economic and Financial Committee, the ECOFIN Council adopts, 
by qualifi ed majority and following the  ‘ comply or explain ’ rule, a decision open-
ing an excessive imbalance procedure. It also adopts a recommendation 29 on the 
socio-economic policies to be adopted to correct the imbalances. (iii) In this case, 
the Member State submits a corrective action plan, which should be endorsed by 
the Council of Finance Ministers. 30 (iv) The DG ECFIN monitors the implemen-
tation of the plan and, in case of violation, the College of Commissioners proposes 
fi nancial sanction (up to 0.1 per cent of GDP). After discussion in the Economic 
and Financial Committee, the ECOFIN Council decides the sanction by reverse 
qualifi ed majority. 31 
 25  Arts 9 – 10 Regulation 473/2013 and Section IV of the Specifi cations of 1 July 2013 on the imple-
mentation of the Two Pack and Guidelines on the format and content of draft budgetary plans, eco-
nomic partnership programmes and debt issuance reports. 
 26  Art 126 (11) TFEU, Art 7 TSCG, Arts 5 – 6 Regulation 1173/2011. 
 27  Art 6 Council Directive EU 2011/85 of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary 
 frameworks of the Member States [2011] OJ L306/41, Art 5 Regulation 473/2013, Art 3(1e) TSCG and 
Communication of the Commission,  ‘ Common principles on national fi scal correction mechanisms ’ 
COM (2012) 342. 
 28  Art 7 Regulation (EU) 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [ 2011 ]  OJ L306/25 . 
 29  This recommendation is adopted on the basis of Art 121(4) TFEU. 
 30  Art 8 Regulation 1176/2011. 
 31  Art 10(4) Regulation 1176/2011 and Art 3(2a)  Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area [ 2011 ]  OJ L306/8 . 
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 C. The Shadow of the Courts 
 As several authors have observed, the reformed economic governance increases 
substantially the role of the national and EU courts in budgetary and economic 
choices and policies. 33 Although Article 126(10) TFEU excludes an infringement 
procedure against a Member State violating the EU fi scal rules, EU courts have 
other means to control the budgetary compliance of the Member States. First, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union controls the transposition (but not the 
implementation) of the golden rule and the national automatic correction mecha-
nism provided by the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG). 34 Secondly, when the Council imposes 
a fi nancial sanction against a defaulting Member State, that State may request an 
annulment of the Council decision by the EU Court. In adjudicating such a case, 
the Court has to review the compliance by the State concerned of the EU budget-
ary rules. In addition, at the national level, the automatic correction may allow 
national courts to annul or suspend a budget violating the Medium Term Objec-
tive (MTO) rule. 
 III. BETTER INSTITUTIONS FOR BETTER RULES COMPLIANCE 
 As the reformed economic governance is mainly based on an interaction between 
national governments, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, 
it is essential that each of those institutions performs their tasks properly. That is 
why EU law, and sometimes international law such as the TSCG, impose mini-
mum requirements on national executives and improve the functioning of the 
Commission and the Council. 
 Regarding national institutions, EU law requirements mainly focus on the pro-
duction of statistical data and economic forecasts as well as on the implemen-
tation of the national correction mechanism. First, public accounting systems 
should be subject to national internal control and independent audits 35 as well 
as to the control of Eurostat, the statistics department of the Commission. 36 
Secondly, macroeconomic forecasts should be realistic, produced or endorsed by 
an independent fi scal council, and signifi cant divergences with the Commission 
forecasts should be explained. 37 Moreover, budgetary forecasts should be realistic 
 33  For instance,  F  Fabbrini ,  ‘ The Euro-Crisis and the Courts :  Judicial Review and the Political 
Process in Comparative Perspective ’ ( 2014 )  32  Berkeley Journal of International Law  64 . 
 34  Art 8 TSCG. 
 35  Art 3 Directive 2011/85. 
 36  Arts 11 – 11b  Council Regulation (EC) 479/2009 of 25 May 2009 on the application of the Protocol 
on the excessive defi cit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community [ 2009 ] 
 OJ L145/1 , amended by  Council Regulation (EC) 679/2010 of 26 July 2010 [ 2010 ]  OJ L198/1 . 
 37  Art 4 Directive 2011/85 and Art 2(1) Regulation 473/2013. 
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and may, but should not necessarily, be produced or endorsed by an independent 
fi scal council. Thirdly, the implementation of the national correction mechanism 
in case of violation of the fi scal rules should be monitored by the independent 
fi scal council. 38 Thus, EU requirements mainly relate to the technical tasks of the 
national executives and the main innovation is the obligation to set up a national 
fi scal authority whose independence and resources are guaranteed. 39 
 Regarding the European Commission, improvements were achieved at the tech-
nical as well as the political levels. At the technical level, the DG ECFIN has been 
reinforced notably with more staff. At the political level, the Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Euro received extensive empowerment in 
order to increase the independence of its decision-making process. 40 
 Regarding the Council of Ministers, improvements have also been achieved at 
the technical and the political levels. 41 At the technical level, the Economic and 
Financial Committee, and its Eurogroup sub-committee (the Eurogroup Work-
ing Group (EWG)) have a full-time and Brussels-based President. At the political 
level, it is envisaged that the Eurogroup will also have a full-time and Brussels-
based President. 42 Moreover, the decision-making process has been made more 
automatic as the majority of the recommendations and the decisions are adopted 
following a  ‘ comply or explain ’ rule and under reverse qualifi ed majority voting. 
 IV. CONFUSION OF ROLES IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 The recent reforms of the EU economic governance gives important new tasks to 
each of its three main actors (national governments, European Commission and 
Council of Ministers) but it does not suffi ciently distinguish between technical 
assessment and discretionary choices and, more critically, it does not suffi ciently 
ensure the effectiveness and the legitimacy of each task. 
 A. Technical Analysis and Assessments 
 Before taking budgetary and economic decisions in economic governance, each of 
the three main institutions involved has to undertake complex technical macro-
economic assessments. At the national level, government departments and inde-
pendent fi scal councils produce statistical data as well as macroeconomic and 
 38  Art 5(2) Regulation 473/2013, Art 3(1e) TSCG and Communication of the Commission,  ‘ Com-
mon principles on national fi scal correction mechanisms ’ COM (2012) 342, Principle 7. 
 39  On the usefulness of the independent fi scal council in correcting the short-term bias of the budge-
tary authority, see  X  Debrun , D Hauner and  M  Kumar ,  ‘ Independent Fiscal Agencies ’ ( 2009 )  23  Journal 
of Economic Surveys  44 . 
 40  See European Commission Press Release, 27 October 2011, IP/11/1284. 
 41  Points 7 and 8 of Annex I to the Euro Summit Statement of 26 October 2011: Ten measures to 
improve the governance of the euro area. 
 42  ibid point 5. 
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budgetary forecasts and, when necessary, implement a national correction mecha-
nism. At the European Commission level, Eurostat controls the statistical data sent 
by the Member States and the DG ECFIN produces macroeconomic and budget-
ary forecasts. At the Council level, the expert committees (Economic and Financial 
Committee, Eurogroup Working Group, Economic Policy Committee, Employ-
ment Committee and Social Protection Committee) analyse implicitly in their 
discussions the validity and the robustness of the Commission technical analysis. 
 To be legitimate and reliable, those technical macroeconomic analyses should 
comply with good governance principles. 43 (i) They should be based on meth-
odologies that are transparent, non-discriminatory between Member States and 
consistent over time, and refl ect mainstream economic theories. (ii) Those meth-
odologies should be periodically assessed and, when needed, corrected or adapted. 
(iii) They should be produced by departments or agencies that are suffi ciently 
independent from the political and budgetary authority to alleviate capture and 
time inconsistency, and that have suffi cient fi nancial and human resources to 
deliver quality work. (iv) Those departments or agencies should cooperate in a 
vertical way (between the national and the European levels) as well in a horizontal 
way (between national authorities) to exchange best practices as well as to develop 
common methodologies. 
 Unfortunately, those principles are not suffi ciently met today. At the national 
level, the most important analysis and forecasts are produced or endorsed by fi scal 
agencies whose independence and resources are guaranteed. 44 However, a vertical 
cooperation between those independent fi scal councils and the European Com-
mission as well as a horizontal cooperation among independent fi scal councils 
have not yet been formally organised. The creation of a European network com-
posed of the national independent fi scal councils and the European Commis-
sion could improve the quality of each member of the network, reinforce their 
independence vis- à -vis their national budgetary authorities and contribute to the 
development of European methodologies. 45 
 At the Commission level, the DG ECFIN depends on the political orienta-
tion given by the College of Commissioners. It is true that the Commissioners 
are independent from the Member States 46 but they are not independent from 
political tendencies. On the contrary, the new President of the Commission, 
Juncker, made clear that he wants a more political Commission. In this context, it 
is more diffi cult to guarantee the independence of the DG ECFIN ’ s analysis. If the 
 43  On those principles see, eg  R  Baldwin ,  M  Cave and  M  Lodge ,  Understanding Regulation:  Theory, 
Strategy and Practice ,  2nd edn ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2012 ) . 
 44  Art 2(1a) Regulation 473/2013. 
 45  Such networks of authorities have been set up for the regulation of network industries:  Regula-
tion (EC)  1211/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 establishing 
the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Offi ce [2009]  OJ 
L337/1 , and  Regulation (EC) 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators [ 2009 ]  OJ L211/1 . 
 46  Art 17(3) TEU. 
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 Commission becomes a fully-fl edged political government of the EU, then the DG 
ECFIN should be removed from the Commission and made an EU fi scal agency 
with similar independence and resource requirements to those imposed by EU law 
for national fi scal councils. 47 
 At the Council level, the functioning and the methodologies used by the techni-
cal committees, in particular the Economic and Financial Committee, remain very 
secretive. For instance, the implementation of methodologies used to determine 
the medium-term objective set for the structural public balance of each Member 
State is not public although this objective is now one of the key rules of the eco-
nomic governance. 48 In addition, the methodologies used to propose the budget-
ary trajectory in case of excessive defi cit procedure are not clear. Therefore, the 
functioning and the methodologies of those technical committees should be more 
transparent. 49 
 B. Discretionary Choices 
 On the basis of those technical assessments, each of the three main institutions 
involved in economic governance enjoys some political discretion in making 
choices about fi scal and economic policies. At the national level, the governments 
decide their budgetary trajectories as well as the level of public expenses and rev-
enues to meet those trajectories. At the Commission level, the College of Commis-
sioners proposes recommendations and decisions on compliance with EU hard 
and soft law by the Member States. In case of corrective procedures, the College 
also proposes the imposition of fi nancial sanctions against defaulting Member 
States. At the Council level, the Ministers decide, often by reverse qualifi ed major-
ity voting, on all the proposals made by the College of Commissioners. 
 To be legitimate in a parliamentary democracy, those discretionary fi scal and 
economic choices should be made by a parliamentary assembly or, at least, by an 
institution directly accountable to a parliamentary assembly. However, the parlia-
mentary oversight needed for economic governance recommendations and deci-
sions is complex because, on the one hand, it relates budgets and policies adopted 
at the national level which calls for national oversight but, on the other hand, it 
relates to decisions having spill-over effects between Member States which calls 
 47  A similar argument can be made for the other quasi-judicial or technical tasks done by the 
 Commission and requiring independence, such as the enforcement of competition rules. 
 48  The methodological principles to calculate the Medium Term Objective are described in the 
Specifi cations of the Council of 3 September 2012 on the implementation of the Stability and Growth 
Pact and in European Commission,  ‘ Vade mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact ’ (2013) (n 3) 151. 
However, the implementation of those principles to calculate the MTO of each Member State is not 
made public. 
 49  J-V  Louis ,  L ’ union europ é enne et sa monnaie , Commentaire M é gret ,  3rd edn ( Brussels ,  Universit é 
de Bruxelles ,  2009 ) . 
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for European oversight. Because of this inherent complexity, the parliamentary 
involvement in the economic governance remains weak to date. 50 
 Recommendations and decisions, and the political choice they imply, are pro-
posed by the Commission and adopted by the Council. The European or national 
parliaments are only indirectly involved as the Commission is accountable before 
the European Parliament and each Minister, member of the Council, is accounta-
ble before his or her own national parliament. Moreover, a soft economic dialogue 
has been set up between, on the one hand, the European Parliament and, on the 
other hand, representatives of EU executive institutions (Commission, Council 
and European Council) or the Member State concerned. 51 
 The question is whether this mere indirect parliamentary involvement is ade-
quate to give democratic legitimacy to budgetary and economic choices having 
far-reaching consequences for the citizens. I think it is not adequate for several 
reasons. First, it involves mainly the European Parliament and not suffi ciently the 
national parliaments whose core competences in fi scal, economic and social poli-
cies are at stake. Secondly, it leads merely to a bilateral relationship between the 
European Parliament and EU or national institutions and not to a multilateral 
relationship between national national parliaments. Thirdly, it merely leads to a 
dialogue and not to recommendations or decisions. 
 Thus the next question is how to ensure a more important involvement of par-
liamentary assemblies without impeding effectiveness. I think this involvement 
should be based on national parliaments (because economic governance relates to 
national budget decisions), having a horizontal dialogue (because those national 
budget decisions have spill-over effects between Member States). Such horizon-
tal parliamentary dialogue would parallel the horizontal executive dialogue in 
the Council. To be effi cient, the horizontal dialogue could be organised within 
a permanent Conference of representatives of national parliaments 52 adopting 
non-binding opinion before the Council of Ministers takes decisions and recom-
mendations on economic governance. 
 In summary, to improve the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the current 
 decision-making process of the European economic governance, I call for a clearer 
distinction between the technical assessment and the discretionary choices made 
by the national governments, the European Commission and the Council of 
 Mini sters. I also suggest subjecting the technical assessments to more  transparency, 
 50  On that point, see also  F  Amtenbrink ,  ‘ General Report ’  The Economic and Monetary Union , XXVI 
FIDE Congress in Copenhagen ( 2014 )  107 and the references to the national reports. 
 51  Art 2-ab Regulation 1466/97 amended; Art 2a Regulation 1467/97 amended; Art 3 Regulation 
1173/2011; Art 14 Regulation 1176/2011; and Art 15 Regulation 473/2013. 
 52  This is not the same as the inter-parliamentary conference set up by Art 13 TSCG which comprises 
representatives of the national parliaments but also the EU Parliament. I think the representatives of 
the EU Parliament should not be part of the Conference because it creates a confusion between the 
EU and the national levels of legitimacy and because economic governance relates to purely national 
decisions. On the diffi culties of the functioning of the Art 13 Inter-parliamentary Conference, see 
 V  Kreilinger ,  ‘ The new Inter-Parliamentary Conference for Economic and Financial Governance ’ 
( Notre Europe — Jacques Delors Institute ,  2013 ) . 
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 consistency, non-discrimination and independence and submitting political 
choices to more democratic parliamentary control. However, such reforms are hard 
to implement for several reasons. Technical assessments and discretionary choices 
are closely related and may be diffi cult to separate. Moreover, the additional control 
by  parliamentary bodies, in particular national parliaments, is diffi cult to set up in 
an effi cient manner. 
 V. THE ALTERNATIVE ROUTE: INTEGRATION INSTEAD 
OF SURVEILLANCE 
 Thus a more radical reform may be required to achieve effectiveness and legiti-
macy more easily. Instead of leaving economic policies entirely in the hands of 
the Member States and increasing their surveillance and coordination, federalising 
part of the economic policies with an increase of the EU budget and/or the crea-
tion of a fi scal capacity for the euro area (and ideally with the granting of taxation 
power to the EU) is the alternative route. This route could be more effective and 
raise fewer legitimacy concerns. 
 Regarding effectiveness, many economists 53 and the Four Presidents Report 54 
claim that a federal budget and partial federal economic policies are needed to 
balance a federal monetary policy. In particular, the creation of a euro area fi scal 
capacity to absorb asymmetric macroeconomic shocks may be necessary to guar-
antee the sustainability of a monetary zone. 55 Regarding legitimacy, the increased 
EU budget or a newly created euro area fi scal capacity could be adopted by the 
European Parliament (or a euro area Parliament) to achieve the double legitimacy 
on which the European integration is now based. 
 VI. CONCLUSION 
 Ideally, a policy reform should meet three conditions: political feasibility, maximi-
sation of its effectiveness and maximisation of its legitimacy. A reform of the EMU 
 53  P  De Grauwe ,  Economics of Monetary Union ,  9th edn ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2012 ) . 
 54  H  Van Rompuy in close collaboration with  J M Barroso ,  J-C  Juncker and  M  Draghi ,  ‘ Towards a 
Genuine Economic and Monetary Union ’  5 December 2012 . 
 55  See also,  F  Fabbrini ,  ‘ From Fiscal Constraints to Fiscal Capacity :  The Future of EMU and its 
Challenges ’ in  M  Adams ,  F  Fabbrini and  P  Larouche (eds),  Constitutionalization of European Budgetary 
Constraints:  Comparative and Interdisciplinary Perspectives ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2014 )  399 – 418 . 
However, the leaders refused at this stage to create such fi scal capacity. It is striking to observe that the 
European Council discussed at the same time the reform of the economic governance and the future of 
the EU budget (the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014 – 2020) and both issues were never linked 
politically, although they are clearly related economically. Since then, a single resolution fund for the 
banking sector has been agreed and may be the fi rst step of a euro area fi scal capacity:  Regulation (EU) 
806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules 
and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment fi rms in the 
framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation 
(EU) 1093/2010 [ 2014 ]  OJ L225/1 and International Agreement of 21 May 2014 on the transfer and 
mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund. 
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ensuring effectiveness and legitimacy is the partial federalisation of the economic 
policies to balance the full federalisation of the monetary policy and the establish-
ment of a fi scal capacity for the euro area. However, this reform is at present not 
politically acceptable although the recently established single resolution fund for 
the banks is an encouraging step in this direction. 
 As the only politically feasible option today is the surveillance and coordina-
tion of the national economic policies based on an executive dialogue between 
national governments, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers in 
the shadow of the Courts, improvements are needed to increase effectiveness and 
legitimacy. First, the technical assessment and the discretionary political choices 
made by each institution should be better distinguished. Secondly, each of those 
tasks should be subjected to additional effectiveness and legitimacy requirements. 
 Regarding the technical analysis and assessments, the newly created national 
fi scal councils should have suffi cient resources and expertise and be truly inde-
pendent from their budgetary authorities, the independence of the DG ECFIN 
should be guaranteed especially as the European Commission becomes more 
politicised and the dialogue among national fi scal councils as well as with the 
Commission should be strengthened, possibly by establishing a formal European 
network of fi scal councils. Moreover, the functioning of Council committees, in 
particular the Economic and Financial Committee and their use of economic 
methodologies, should be more transparent. 
 Regarding discretionary choices, these need to be explicitly recognised instead 
of remaining hidden behind complex economic analysis and EU rules. Once rec-
ognised, they should be better legitimised. One way to do that is to require that 
economic governance recommendations and decisions adopted by the Council 
of Ministers take into account an opinion of a newly created conference of repre-
sentatives of national parliaments. 
 

